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NOTES
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION REMEDIES
AGAINST A RECALCITRANT UNIT OWNER
INTRODUCTION
Man has always felt the need to live communally, in one
form or another.' For modern America, this need could not be
completely satisfied until it became tax-deductible.2 Thus, the
condominium was born.!
The condominium concept did not catch on in the United
States until the 1960s.' Prior to that time, the cooperative,
1 Witness, for example, the cave-dwellers and the nomads. Condominiums may
have existed under Roman law, but this point is disputed. See Curtis J. Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 987, 987-88
(1963) (noting that the origins of the condominium pre-date Caesar); William
Schwartz, Condominium: A Hybrid Castle in the Sky, 44 B.U. L. REV. 137, 141
(1964) (relating the origin of the condominium to the Roman era); see also William
K. Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 3 (1963)
(noting a claim that the condominium concept can be traced back to the ancient He-
brews in the Fifth Century B.C.).
2 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1994) (allowing deductions for the interest portion of
qualified mortgage indebtedness).
a While their first existence in fact is widely disputed, condominiums were first
afforded statutory recognition by the Code Napoleon in 1804. See Kerr, supra note 1,
at 3. The condominium concept did not take root in this country until experimenta-
tion by Puerto Rico and an amendment of the National Housing Act authorized an-
other requisite to the satisfaction of modern man-insurance. See id. at 1; § 119 of
the National Housing Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 769, 780 (amending § 234 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1994), and allowing insurance for a "multi-family
project," even if it was not a "multi-family structure").
4 See Howard E. Kane & W. Richard Helms, The Illinois Condominium Property
Act, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 157, 157 (1970) ("By the end of 1963, thirty-nine states had
passed condominium acts, with thirty-two states adopting such legislation in 1963
alone."); Kerr, supra note 1, at 1. Vermont was the final state to pass legislation in
1969. See id. Presently, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands have passed enabling statutes. See Guy Batsel, Note, Florida Con-
dominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a
State Regulatory Agency, 25 FLA. L. REV. 350, 350 (1973).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
which in the United States dates back to the late nineteenth cen-
tury,5 was the only form of community living to gain widespread
acceptance through the first half of the twentieth century.5
While the cooperative satisfied the needs of the time,7 its basic
structure8 cried out for a suitable replacement. One could never
be secure knowing that all one actually owned was a leasehold
interest. The condominium, on the other hand, afforded unit
owners an actual fee estate.9 This individual ownership, how-
ever, creates its own problems for the condominium associations
and the jurisdictions which enable them."0 Since the unit owner
of a condominium is a title holder in fee, dealing with the recalci-
trant unit owner can pose particular problems for the condomin-
6 The earliest reported case involving a cooperative apartment is Barrington
Apt. Ass'n v. Watson, 38 Hun 545 (N.Y. 1886).
6 See Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or
Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1106 (1969) (noting coopera-
tives have been used for decades). Even then, acceptance was limited to only a few
major metropolitan areas, primarily New York. See Berger, supra note 1, at 991-92.
For a discussion of the different types of available cooperatives, see generally Phillip
N. Smith, Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Own-
ership, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305 (1961).
7 In particular, cooperatives provided a solution to the shortage of affordable
housing following both World Wars. See Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (1948). Unfortunately, the Great Depression wiped out a
large portion of cooperatives created after World War I. See id. at 1410. After World
War II, cooperatives' popularity was spurred on by a landowner's ability to remove
his apartments from rent-ceiling regulations by converting them to cooperatives.
See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Condominiums & Cooperative Apartments § 61 (1976); Robert
Marks & Kenneth J. Marks, Coercive Aspects of Housing Cooperatives, 42 U. ILL. L.
REv. 728, 728 (1948).
Cooperatives are structured so that the cooperator is essentially a tenant. See
infra Part I
See infra Part I.
l' Not the least of these problems is how to define the estate. Many jurisdictions
refer to the unit owner's entire estate simply as a "condominium," so that, in order
to assess real estate taxes, the taxing legislation will generally read similar to, "each
condominium owned in fee shall be separately assessed to the owner thereof." CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 2188.3 (Deering 1995). Alternatively, in some jurisdictions,
such as the District of Columbia, "condominium" means "the ownership of single
units in a multi-unit structure with common elements," 77 Stat. 449, 449 §
2(b)(1963), a "condominium unit" is the individual apartment, and "unit and the
percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to
such unit," 77 Stat. 449, 460 § 25(a) (1963), refers to the unit owner's entire interest.
There, the relevant taxing provision is more akin to, "[aill real property taxes...
shall be levied on each apartment and its respective appurtenant fractional share or
percentage of the land, general common elements and limited common elements
where applicable as such apartments and appurtenances are separately owned, and
not on the entire horizontal property regime." IOWA CODE ANN. § 4998.11 (West
1991).
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ium association which do not exist for the cooperative associa-
tion."
This Note will discuss the remedies available to a condomin-
ium association when dealing with a recalcitrant unit owner who
violates a restriction imposed by the association, and the means
by which those remedies may be enforced. Of particular impor-
tance to this analysis is the standard of review which courts may
use in determining whether to enforce the restriction in question
at all.' In addition, this Note covers the ability of a condomin-
ium association to recover attorney's fees.'
Part I begins with a brief comparison of the differences be-
tween condominiums and cooperatives, focusing on why the
structure of a condominium makes dealing with a recalcitrant
unit owner particularly difficult. Part II covers the various ap-
proaches a court may take in determining whether a given re-
striction is valid and enforceable. Part III is a discussion of the
remedies available to condominium associations, in particular
the ability to suspend voting rights, privileges, and services, and
the ability to assess monetary sanctions or fines. Finally, to help
the association be more effective in its efforts, the defenses the
unit owner may raise as well as suggestions to the association
are discussed in Parts IV and V, respectively.
I. CONDOMINIUMS V. COOPERATIVES
Whereas the major characteristics of a condominium are in-
dividual ownership of a unit, an undivided interest in common
areas, and an agreement among the unit owners regulating the
administration and maintenance of property, 4 a cooperative is
defined as a multi-unit dwelling where each resident has an in-
" The cooperator holds only a leasehold estate. Therefore, a violator of the rules
(which are generally incorporated, at the very least by reference, into the lease),
may be evicted. Because the owner of a condominium unit is a title holder in fee, no
such remedy is available to the condominium association. See infra note 21.
12 The section outlining the different standards which courts apply is of most
beneficial use to the newly-formed or soon-to-be-formed condominium association.
'3 This is needed because oftentimes the cost of recovering the unpaid assess-
ment or fine (including administrative and filing costs, as well as attorney's fees)
will exceed the amount to be recovered. See infra Part III. It should be noted that
the ability to recover costs is necessary to ensure the rights of the association (else
they may be seen as attempting to "run up" the charges on a unit owner and, thus,
coming in with unclean hands, see infra Part IV), and also to set an example to
other unit owners that they will be forced to pay, if necessary.
14 See supra note 10.
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terest in the entity owning the building15 and a lease entitling
him to occupy a particular apartment within the building.16 This
structure of a cooperative lends itself to a much simpler resolu-
tion of difficulties, from the perspective of the governing associa-
tion.
For example, while the condominium association may have
various degrees of difficulty in dealing with the recalcitrant unit
owner, for reasons as diverse as keeping up unsightly decora-
tions,17 causing an alleged nuisance," or simply general non-
conformity with the rules, 9 cooperative associations have been
able to evict cooperators for reasons as minor as keeping a pet.20
The nature of a cooperator's interest is that he typically owns
stock in a corporation which owns the cooperative complex. He
is then entitled to lease an apartment from the corporation. As
such, many of the normal rules of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship apply, including the ability of the landlord to evict the ten-
ant.2' Conversely, since the condominium unit owner is a title
16 This entity is typically a corporation. See generally 2A PATRICK J. ROHAN &
MELVIN A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.01-02 (1998)
(explaining the organization of a cooperative corporation).
'6 See supra note 11.
17 See Stewart v. Kopp, 454 S.E.2d 672, 673-74 (N.C. 1995) (holding condomin-
ium association was entitled to an injunction ordering a unit owner to remove unau-
thorized decorations).
"s See, e.g., Unit Owners' Ass'n of BuildAmerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378,
382 (Va. 1982) (alleging that unit owner caused nuisance by storing garbage trucks
in common area of condominium).
9 See, e.g., Dunlap v. Bavarian Village Condo. Ass'n, 780 P.2d 1012, 1014
(Alaska 1989) (seeking judicial intervention against a unit owner who failed to
comply with a parking regulation prohibiting the storage of a vehicle in the condo-
minium parking area).
20 See, e.g., Hilltop Village Coop. #4, Inc. v. Goldstein, 252 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct.
App. Term. 1964) (granting an order of eviction unless a dog kept in contravention
of a house rule against pets, for therapeutic purposes for the cooperator's mentally
ill child, was disposed of within ninety days), affd, 258 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div.
1965).
2 The landlord will have the ability to evict the tenant for a breach of the lease.
See, e.g., Ramsey, Condominium: The New Look in Co-ops, at 4 (HOME TIT. GUAR.
Co. 1962) (explaining that the cooperator is "basically a tenant under a lease which
is subject to forfeiture in the event of a default or breach of condition thereunder");
cf John E. Cribbet, Condominum-Home Ownership For Megalopolis?, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 1207, 1237 (1963) (comparing the condominium to the cooperative and discuss-
ing the benefit of being an owner of a condominium unit).
Courts, however, are not likely to simply evict a cooperator, even for somewhat
substantial breaches of the proprietary lease. See 2A PATRICK J. RoHAN & MELVIN
A. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW & PRACTICE § 11.02[21 (1998) ("For equitable rea-
sons, the courts usually give the tenant the opportunity to cure the breach and
grant to the landlord a judgment of eviction if the tenant fails to remedy the viola-
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holder in fee of his unit, eviction per se is never an option.' For-
tunately, there are other remedies available.'
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF USE RESTRICTIONS
A. Introduction
When we address the issue of dealing with the "recalcitrant"
unit owner, we are making reference to one who is continually
violating the house rules, or, in some cases, violating one house
rule repeatedly. Any analysis of whether a house rule has been
broken must then begin with a determination as to what is the
appropriate scope of the particular house rule. Most courts will
break the analysis into two parts. The first "prong" is a deter-
mination by the court as to whether the association is authorized
to enact such a house rule at all, and/or whether the association
has complied with the proper procedures in enacting such a
rule.24 Assuming the violation in question is of some properly
authorized and enacted house rule, the court's analysis will then
turn to the second prong-the substance of the rule itself. As to
this second prong, the approaches taken by the various jurisdic-
tions can be broken down into three main analyses or combina-
tions thereof.2 Some jurisdictions apply a true "reasonableness"
standard.26 Others prefer to use the "business judgment rule."27
tion.").
22 The results would be similar to attempting to get a neighbor evicted. See 2A
ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 11.051] ([T]he cooperative [association] is said
to be in a better position to defend itself [than a condominium association] because
its constituents are merely lessees and hence run the risk of forfeiting their right of
occupancy for recalcitrant behavior.").
See infra Part ]I. It should be noted that because condominium and coopera-
tive associations are very similar in the way they are managed, notwithstanding
their differences in structure, many of the remedies described herein will translate
for use in a cooperative structure. See, e.g., 2A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, §
11.02[2] ("Condominium house rules follow the basic outlines set forth in this sec-
tion, but substitute a 'condominium association' and 'board of managers' in place of
the cooperative association and its directors.").
24 See, e.g., Johnson v. Keith, 331 N.E.2d 879, 882 (Mass. 1975) (invalidating a
house rule because the particular rule required an amendment to the by-laws, which
required a two-thirds vote, as opposed to an addition to the house rules, which re-
quired a simple majority).
2 A fourth view, of sorts, may also exist, which puts hardly any limitations on
an association's right to create restrictions. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §
11-104(c) (1992 & Supp. 1997) ("The bylaws also may contain any other provision
regarding the management and operation of the condominium .... ").
26 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313, 1317 (D.C. 1986) (electing to ap-
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The third analysis performed by some courts is that of a contrac-
tarian approach. Whereas the first two approaches provide a
test for the courts, the contractarian view is not necessarily a
test on its own, but rather a perspective that aids in determining
whether a given restriction is reasonable. Many jurisdictions
use a reasonableness test without considering the contractarian
view, however, each approach needs to be addressed separately.
B. The First Prong
Initially under consideration is the condominium associa-
tion's ability to restrict the rights of unit owners. These restric-
tions might come in the form of preventing unit owners from
putting up the style of door they wish, owning pets, or even col-
lecting from the unit owner fines imposed for violating some
house rule. The ability to restrict the rights of the unit owners
also includes the association's ability to recover its costs of recov-
ery, including attorney's fees. For a restriction to be valid at all,
the condominium as an initial matter must have the authority to
enact it.2 While not all courts classify it as such, this is essen-
tially the first prong of a two-pronged test.2 9
The authority to restrict the unit owner could come from the
ply a "reasonableness" standard of review over the "business judgment rule").
27 Some courts, in applying the business judgment rule, will consider an asso-
ciation's restrictions "reasonable" if they comply with the business judgment stan-
dard. See infra Part III.
28 See Miesch v. Ocean Dunes Homeowners' Ass'n, 464 S.E.2d 64, 68 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that a North Carolina Condominium Act provision adopted in
1986 did not apply to existing condominiums); see also 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra
note 21, § 45.04[1] (asserting that to be able to assess fees, penalties, etc., the asso-
ciation needs statutory authority and/or authority granted pursuant to the declara-
tion of the condominium).
This statutory authority, of course, is still subject to judicial interpretation. See
Stewart v. Kopp, 454 S.E.2d 672, 675 (N.C. 1995) (finding a statute authorizing fines
of up to $150 per violation, and assessment of a fine of $100 per day valid, otherwise
a unit owner could simply pay the $150 fine and then ignore the association).
Unquestionably the only substantial reason that a provision need be able to
withstand judicial scrutiny is if it eventually becomes necessary to resort to the
courts to enforce the rules. An association could enact any type of provision it
wishes, and so long as the unit owners comply (including by paying any fines or as-
sessments pursuant to such rules), there will be no problem. But if the unit owner
refuses to comply, it may be necessary to resort to the courts to obtain compliance.
29 See, e.g., Thanasoulis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, 542 A.2d 900, 903 (N.J.
1988) (using a two-pronged test to determine whether the action taken by the board
was allowed: first, if it was authorized by statute or the by-laws and, second, that it
was not fraudulent, self-dealing, or unconscionable).
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by-laws of the association, the declaration of the condominium,"°
statute, or any combination of the above.3 The most preferable
situation is one in which the provision in question is authorized
by all sources from its inception.32 Even though the by-laws
might authorize the association to amend the house rules as nec-
essary, for example, this is not always considered enough
"authorization" for the provision to withstand judicial scrutiny. 33
C. The Second Prong
Upon a determination that a unit owner has acted in contra-
vention of a properly authorized and enacted house rule, the
court will then turn to the second prong-the substance of the
rule itself. The analytical theory that underlies a court's second
prong analysis may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
may be classified into three categories or combinations thereof: a
Reasonableness Test, the Business Judgment Rule, and the Con-
tractarian View.
1. The Reasonableness Test
Under the Reasonableness Test, the courts will enforce any
restrictions which are deemed "reasonable." The question then
becomes a matter of what the court will deem reasonable. Part
" The declaration of condominium is similar to the articles of incorporation of a
business.31 "Having the authority to enact" necessarily includes not being restricted from
enacting the relevant provision as well.
32 See, e.g., Unit Owners' Ass'n of BuildAmerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378,
385 (Va. 1982) ("A prospective purchaser of a unit is charged with notice of the con-
tents of the master deed and of the bylaws and therefore has the option at the time
of purchase to determine whether to sign an agreement and purchase a unit with
such a restriction or limitation.").
"See, e.g., Johnson v. Keith, 331 N.E.2d 879, 881-82 (Mass. 1975) (holding that
despite the by-laws' incorporation of the house rules, a restriction in the house rules
against pets was invalid because the house rules could be amended by the board of
managers and the by-laws could only be amended by a two-thirds vote of the unit
owners). An action pertaining to the condominium property must be taken in accor-
dance with the by-laws. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §339-u (McKinney 1989).
Cooperative provisions are subject to similar invalidation upon judicial review.
See, e.g., North Broadway Estates, Ltd. v. Schmoldt, 559 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (Civ. Ct.
1990) (holding that the cooperative association exceeded its authority in attempting
to change the type of penalty by "adopting a house rule rather than amending the
proprietary lease").
These cases are no doubt attributable, at least in part, to judicial concern re-
garding proper notice to the unit owner. Along these lines, see 1 RoHAN & RESKIN,
supra note 21, § 42.06[4 (suggesting that house rules should be distributed periodi-
caly).
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of this determination will undoubtedly be dependant upon the
remedy sought. For example, an association attempting to se-
cure an injunction against the playing of loud music at an inap-
propriate hour is more likely to prevail than an association
seeking thousands of dollars in unpaid fines and assessments, as
well as attorney's fees, simply because the unit owner has put up
a sign which does not comport with the association's taste. Al-
though living in a condominium offers the advantages of owning
property in fee for less than the cost of purchasing or maintain-
ing a home, there is unfortunately a corresponding loss of unre-
stricted freedom which inevitably accompanies community liv-
ing.' It is with this corresponding loss of freedom in mind that
courts review use restrictions, assessments, penalties, and the
like, to determine whether they are indeed reasonable. In doing
so, some courts consider a provision reasonable if it is enacted for
the good of the "health, happiness and enjoyment of life of vari-
ous unit owners.""5 Other courts will decide whether the provi-
sion is reasonable in light of the contractarian nature of the
agreement between the unit. owner and the association.3 6
As with any reasonableness analysis, the judicial review of a
use restriction is extremely subjective and fact-based. Thus, one
jurisdiction may find a given restriction to be reasonable, while
another may not. 7 Regardless, an overriding judicial concern in
3 See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Discussing the drawbacks of condominium ownership, the
court noted that:
[inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote the
health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners
since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in common,
each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which
he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.
Id.
35 Id. at 181; accord, Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that the installation of locks on doors that provide entry to common areas
was a reasonable exercise of the board's authority). But see Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E. 994, 1001 (N.Y. 1979) (finding that the business judgment rule was imple-
mented to restrict judicial review of directors, unless there exists an allegation of
bad faith); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners' Ass'n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 523, 529
(App. Div. 1987) (holding that the court should "limit its inquiry to whether the
[board's] action was authorized and whether it was taken in good faith and in fur-
therance of the legitimate interests of the condominium").
3" See infra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (upholding age restriction on potential unit holders implemented by the
condominium association). But see Camino Gardens Ass'n v. McKim, 612 So. 2d 636,
638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding restraints on alienation subject to acceptance
254 [73:247
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION REMEDIES
any reasonableness analysis is one of proper notice to the unit
owner. If the restriction was in place before the unit owner pur-
chased the condominium, the restriction is "clothed with a very
strong presumption of validity."38
In addition, using such a subjective standard opens the door
to the use of the courts' equity powers. For example, one of the
defenses available to a unit owner is that of selective enforce-
ment. If a restriction, which is otherwise reasonable, is only en-
forced against a unit owner that is not in good favor with the
board, it is entirely possible that the court will find the restric-
tion unreasonable. In either event, whether the restriction itself
is unreasonable or the association's application of the rule is un-
reasonable, the result is be the same-the board will be power-
less to enforce the provision against the unit owner.
2. The Business Judgment Rule
The Business Judgment Rule is an approach adopted by cer-
tain jurisdictions to determine whether the board's action was so
unreasonable as to warrant judicial intervention. 9 This ap-
proach likens the association to a corporation, and the board of
managers to a board of directors." Under this theory, the provi-
by the condominium association unreasonable).
28 Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981). The court further stated:
[This presumption] arises from the fact that each individual unit owner
purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed.
Such restrictions are very much in the nature of covenants running with
the land and they will not be invalidated absent a showing that they are
wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of public policy, or that
they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.... Indeed, a use re-
striction in [the originating documents] may have a certain degree of un-
reasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts.
Id. at 639-40; see also Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d
378, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that language that is unambiguous and
agreed to by the parties will be upheld); Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 269
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (awarding the condominium association $15,000 and granting
an injunction that required the unit owner to remove her dogs because the unit
owner purchased her unit even though she was on notice of the restriction, despite
the fact that the case was moot because the unit owner and her dogs died together
in an accident).
9See 6A PATRICK J. ROHAN, HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND PUDs § 7A.06, at
7A-120 (1998) (stating that courts are willing to apply the business judgment rule to
the condominium association); Schoninger, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (stating that the
business judgment rule restrains courts from deciding whether a director acted
properly).
40 See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.07[4].
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sion in question is valid so long as the board has acted in good
faith and in furtherance of the legitimate interests of the con-
dominium. 41 This approach also operates generally to protect the
association from liability for its acts, absent a showing of "lack of
good faith, fraud, self-dealing or unconscionable conduct."1
2
Typically, the burden of proof is on the moving party. Thus, in
an action to enforce its restrictions, or recover fines, the board
may be forced to show that it has acted in good faith and in fur-
therance of the legitimate interests of the condominium.43 In
other words, some jurisdictions require a showing by the board
that its actions were not arbitrary or capricious."
It should be noted that as with any standard business judg-
ment rule application, the board will not be protected upon a
showing of bad faith, or if the board knowingly participates in or
condones wrongful or negligent conduct.45 Thus, to ensure that
its decisions will be upheld and to shield itself from liability, the
board should keep a record of its actions and reasons therefor.
Such reasons may include suggestions from an independent,
outside party whose advice the board has sought. The business
judgment approach has been viewed by some as giving too much
leeway to the association, and has come under criticism from
As a side note, because of the structure of a cooperative-i.e. each cooperator
owns stock in a corporation that leases a unit to the cooperator-the business judg-
ment rule is more readily applied to cases involving cooperatives than to cases in-
volving condominiums.
41 See Agassiz W. Condominium Ass'n v. Solum, 527 N.W.2d 244 (N.D. 1995)
(stating that a court's inquiry into the decisions of board members is limited);
Schoninger, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (reasoning that it is up to the court to decide
whether the board acted in good faith to the benefit of the condominium and
whether its actions were authorized-the business judgment rule precludes any
other analysis).
42 Dockside Ass'n v. Detyens, 362 S.E.2d 874 (S.C. 1987) (holding that the busi-
nessudgment rule applies to condominium associations).
See 6A ROHAN, supra note 39, at 120-21. ("Officers and directors of the asso-
ciation have a fiduciary responsibility to exercise ordinary care in performing their
duties and are required to act reasonably and in good faith.") Id.
"See Goddard v. Fairways Dev. Gen. Partnership, 426 S.E.2d 828 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that while the business judgment rule will protect the board
from attack, it does not prevent dismissal of a board's petition to terminate a unit
owner's month-to-month tenancy, absent a showing by the board of any reason for
terminating the tenancy).
45 See 6A ROHAN, supra note 38, at 7A-122 (stating that board members must
act within their authority); see also Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev.,
Co., 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1981) (discussing the fiduciary duty owed to a
community association by directors--directors may not act in their own interests at
the expense of the association).
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many commentators.46
3. The Contractarian View
The Contractarian View proposes that individuals, so long
as they are competent, are free to contract (or not to contract) for
whatever they wish. The by-laws, and to an extent the house
rules, are viewed as a contract between the unit owner and the
association, and as such are governed by general contract prin-
ciples." Many courts will use this approach in conducting a rea-
sonableness analysis. Essentially, this means that most restric-
tions created by the association and agreed to by the unit owner
will be upheld.
This view often becomes most controversial when a court
applies it to an attorney fee-shifting clause." While the contrac-
4" See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-w (McKinney 1989):
The manager or board of managers, as the case may be, shall keep de-
tailed, accurate records, in chronological order, of the receipts and expendi-
tures arising from the operation of the property. Such records and the
vouchers authorizing the payments shall be available for examination by
the unit owners at convenient hours of weekdays. A written report sum-
marizing such receipts and expenditures shall be rendered by the board of
managers to all unit owners at least once annually.
Id.; WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMIII AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE:
COmMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 6.02 (a)(1), at 212-218 (2d ed. 1988). Hyatt denotes
four general principles that form the business judgment rule. Board members must
act with reasonable care when fulfilling their responsibilities and, in so doing, they
must seek the requisite information to make responsible decisions. They are re-
sponsible for and must oversee those to which they delegate duties, and only dele-
gate those duties which may be done by others. Finally, a general premise to which
board members should adhere to ensure that they fall within the protection of the
business judgment rule is to act with "good faith, diligence, care, and skill." Id. at
213; Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use Restrictions: Applying
the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653 (1988); Jeffrey A. Gold-
berg, Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 653,
664-67 (1988); see also Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 271 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993) (rejecting the business judgment rule, which has received 'varying degrees of
approval among commentators").
47 See Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 401 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1979). The court did not grant attorney's fees because the by-laws required at-
torney's fees only when the board took legal action for non-compliance with the by-
laws and not when the board itself was the defendant. See id. at 288. See generally
Cohen v. Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 206 A.2d 585, 589 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965)
(holding that an arm's length transaction in which the parties agree to pay the other
side's attorney's fees if the contract is breached is not void as against public policy),
affd, 210 A.2d 73 (N.J. 1965).
48 See Nottingdale Homeowners' Ass'n v. Darby, 514 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ohio
1987). The court reasoned that a fee shifting clause, when entered into freely by the
contracting parties, must be held valid for policy reasons, stating that the defen-
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tarian view has been criticized for giving, in many cases, too
much power to the condominium association,49 this approach in
its early days actually created significant problems for the asso-
ciations.0 As with any contract, the requirement that a default-
ing party pay some pre-set amount of dollars to another party
will be upheld so long as the amount is considered to be a rea-
sonable expectation of the other party's damages.5 Courts, how-
ever, generally do not like to impose a penalty upon one party for
dants must be held responsible for the association's attorney's fees because a refusal
to enforce the fee-shifting provision would effectively bring an end to such associa-
tions. See id.; see also Blount v. Smith, 231 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio 1967) (holding
that the right to contract freely is as fundamental as the right to write and speak
without restraint, and observing that contracts entered into freely must be upheld);
Cohen, 206 A.2d at 589 (stating that if agreed to in an arm's length transaction, a
fee-shifting clause will be held valid). But see Darby, 514 N.E.2d at 708 (Locher, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that absent a statutory provision allowing recoupment of attor-
ney's fees, contractual provisions requiring recovery of such fees are invalid because
the parties do not have equal bargaining power).
'9 See Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium
Rules, 22 STETSON L. REv. 1133, 1149 (1993). Schiller asserts that if the contractar-
ian view were applied across the board, unit owners who challenge restrictions
would invariably lose:
Although the contract theory has considerable justification when used to
uphold existing restrictions contained in the declaration and bylaws at the
time the unit owner purchased his condominium unit, it loses force when
applied to rules and amendments to the declaration and bylaws promul-
gated after the purchase has occurred. As to these subsequently enacted
limitations, there is very little logic in saying a unit owner has consented in
advance to being bound by them, even if they are unfair or discriminatory
as applied to the particular unit owner.
Id. But see id. at 1168 (arguing that the reasonableness standard creates unpredict-
able results). The article endorses alternative methods of dispute resolution, such as
internal mechanisms in the condominium documents. See id. For an example of a
statute that provides for dispute mechanisms designed to resolve disputes between
unit owners and the association, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255 (West 1991).
See Rajski v. Tezich, 514 N.E.2d 347, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (finding a fine
of ten dollars per day for violations of covenants to be an unenforceable penalty);
Unit Owners Ass'n of BuildAmerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378 (Va. 1982) (holding
that since the imposition of fines is a governmental power, an association could not
penalize without authority). But see Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 146
Cal. Rptr. 695, 697 (Ct. App. 1978) (upholding a condominium restriction allowing
only persons eighteen years of age and older occupancy in a unit).
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979) (stating that an-
ticipated damages must be reasonable to be upheld). For a recent discussion of liq-
uidated damages, see Perfect Solutions, Inc. v. Jerrod, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 77, 84 (D.
Mass. 1997) (precluding summary judgment on the issue of whether liquidated
damages took the form of a penalty). The court left the issue of liquidated damages
for the trier of fact to determine whether the amount reflected a reasonable ascer-
tainment of damages. See id. The court concluded by stating that if the liquidated
damages section had a built-in penalty, it would be invalid. See id.
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default. 2 To the extent the fine assessed by the condominium
association was viewed as a penalty, as opposed to a recoupment
of the "damages" of the association, courts taking the contractar-
ian approach would invalidate the assessment."3 In addition, as
applied to condominiums, courts do not like the idea of giving the
association the power to force the unit owner into submission
through penalties, particularly where the failure to pay fines and
assessments will create a lien on the unit, with the possibility of
foreclosure in the future.'
Some courts are willing to embrace this view, and even take
it to its extreme. For example, in Unit Owners' Ass'n of BuildA-
merica-1 v. Gillman,5 the defendant rented a commercial con-
dominium from the plaintiff, out of which the defendant ran a
garbage-hauling business and stored trucks." After over a year
in the unit, and the purchase of another unit to expand their
business without a complaint, the board enacted a house rule
providing a maximum weight for trucks stored on the property,
aimed specifically at the Gillmans,"7 and assessed a fine of $25
per day, per infraction." This amounted to $125 per day for the
Gillmans and their five trucks.59 When the fine reached $8000,
the board decided to double it.6' The association brought suit to
recover the fines assessed when they reached over $20,000.6
1
The court noted that from the testimony of the board members,
it was clear they were trying to punish the Gilmans, not assess
them. 2 In particular, one board member said that fining better
suited the purpose of the board, because the only way to get the
62 See, e.g., H.J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 55 A2d 793, 795-96 (Md. 1947) (holding
a fixed liquidated damages clause to be a penalty and thus unenforceable).
r' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979) ("A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy
as a penalty."). See generally North Broadway Estates, Ltd. v. Schmoldt, 559
N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (N.Y. City Ct. 1990) (stating that the authority of the board to ex-
act fees is limited to the parameters of the lease); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach
Homeowners' Ass'n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 523, 530 (App. Div. 1987) (upholding fee shifting
because it is authorized in the by-laws).
"See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-aa (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998) (providing
the remedy of foreclosure to recover an outstanding lien against a unit owner).
292 S.E.2d 378 (Va. 1982).
See id. at 380.
r7 See id.
6s See i&L
9See id.
cSee id.
61 See id.
2See id.
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Gillmans out was to "ruin them."' Even here, where the court
was wary of the greater than $20,000 fine assessed against the
Gillmans, it remanded the case for a determination as to
whether the relevant provision was "reasonable," keeping in
mind that the Gillmans were put on notice at the time of signing
that the rules were subject to change.' Ultimately, the court
found the imposition of fines to be an unconstitutional penalty
which could be imposed only by a governmental body.6
Not all courts, however, are as willing to enforce the asso-
ciation's rules as was the lower court in BuildAmerica.66 Essen-
tially, because the unit owner has agreed to abide by the rules
(and to the board's authority to amend the rules), he is estopped
from claiming that the rules should not be enforced against him.
The court, however, may be unwilling to use its equity power of
estoppel where the board is attempting to perpetuate its own
wrongdoing. 7
III. THE SOLUTIONS
The common remedies available to a condominium associa-
tion are: suspension of voting rights, suspension of privileges or
services and monetary sanctions or fines.68 In the event of a
continued failure to comply, the association may also be entitled
to an injunction69 and/or a lien against the property,70 which
6Id. at 384.
64 See id.
"See id. at 383-84.
"Neither was the Virginia legislature, which amended its laws governing con-
dominiums after the BuildAnerica decision. See 1A RoHAN & RESKIN, supra note
21, § 44.06[31; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.53 (1998) (allowing assessments
against unit owners by associations, but omitting use of the words "penalty" or
"fines").
"See Barnett & Klein Corp. v. President of Palm Beach (A Condominium), 426
So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that the unit owner was not equitably
estopped from bringing a claim because he had signed a letter agreeing to obey all of
the house rules; the court refused to use an equitable remedy to allow the associa-
tion to profit from and perpetuate its own wrongdoing).
8See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3] [6] [1].
r9 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney 1989):
Failure to comply with [the by-laws and rules] shall be ground for an action
to recover sums due, for damages or injunctive relief or both.... In any
case of flagrant or repeated violation by a unit owner, he may be required
by the board of managers to give sufficient surety or sureties for his future
compliance with the by-laws, rules, regulations, resolutions and decisions.
Id.; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 519-102 (West 1993); The 400 Condominium Ass'n
v. Tully, 398 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
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could end in foreclosure. 71 Additionally, the association may be
entitled to an action for breach of covenant to pay 2 and certain
self-help remedies, such as the towing of cars or the hiring of a
third party to maintain a unit owner's area. While there are a
wide variety of remedies available to the condominium associa-
tion, the effectiveness of these remedies is equally varied. An
examination of several of these remedies will allow the associa-
tion to determine which remedy will best suit its needs. The as-
sociation should keep in mind that these remedies are available
only to the extent authorized (or not prohibited) by the governing
statutes, the declaration of condominium, and the by-laws, and
only so long as they pass the appropriate "test."73
A. Suspension of Voting Rights
So long as it is provided for in the by-laws, the right to vote
at association meetings may be suspended. However, this form
70 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998) ("The
board of managers, on behalf of the unit owners, shall have a lien on each unit for
the unpaid common charges thereof, together with interest thereon...."); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 339-aa (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998) ("The lien provided for in
the immediately preceding section shall be effective from and after the filing.. and
shall continue in effect until all sums secured thereby, with the interest thereon,
shall have been fully paid or until expiration six years from the date of filing....");
see also Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 440 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (Il. App. Ct.
1982) (upholding a by-law that provided a successor to the original developer's in-
terest the right to enforce a "lien against the interest of the unit owned by the
owner.").
71 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-aa (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998),
which provides in pertinent part:
Such lien may be foreclosed by suit authorized by and brought in the name
of the board of managers.... In any such foreclosure the unit owner shall
be required to pay a reasonable rental for the unit for any period prior to
sale ... if so provided in the by-aws.. .. The board of managers, acting on
behalf of the unit owners, shall have power, unless prohibited by the by-
laws, to bid in the unit at foreclosure sale.... Suit to recover a money
judgment for unpaid common charges shall be maintainable without fore-
closing or waiving the lien securing the same, and foreclosure shall be
maintainable notwithstanding the pendency of suit to recover a money
judgment.
Id. This language also demonstrates the importance of authorizing board action
through the by-laws.
7See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 45.1012][al ("In general, an asso-
ciation may obtain a money judgment against a unit owner for unpaid maintenance
assessments more quickly than it can obtain title to a condominium unit in a lien
foreclosure proceeding.").
7See supra Part H.
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of remedy may be less effective than the others.' In addition to
possibly requiring a due process hearing,7 5 a potentially costly
and time-consuming remedy, it may not create the desired effect.
Many unit owners who do not follow the rules of a condominium
may not care about its operation or even attend association
meetings. 6 In effect, this means that the unit owner may feel
that he has lost little, if anything at all. Ultimately, this remedy
is one of the least effective means of encouraging compliance and
is possibly more trouble than it is worth.
B. Suspension of Privileges or Services
From the association's point of view, suspension of a unit
owner's privileges or services may be a very effective means of
exacting compliance, so long as it is provided for in the governing
documents and/or by statute. 7 One reason individuals might
decide to join a condominium association is for the extra benefits
provided at a fraction of the cost of having those same benefits
individually. For example, it is more cost-effective to have a
common swimming pool, maintained by only a couple of people
for the benefit of all, or to have a maid or laundry service pro-
vided at a "group" discount rate, than it would be to have these
amenities in a private home. Suspending an individual's right to
use the pool during the summer, for example, may prove very ef-
fective.
At the same time, courts frown upon the unit owner who re-
sorts to self-help remedies such as withholding common
charges.7 s At least one court has noted a legislative trend to-
7 See 1A ROHM & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3] [b] [ii] (noting that "those
who do not comply with the rules of an association do not participate in it either...
revocation of voting rights is an ineffective means of encouraging compliance").
75 We are dealing generally with property rights. Therefore due process is in-
voked even though the association is typically not considered a government agency.
For some courts, the hearing based on a suit brought either by the association or the
unit owner to enforce particular rights is enough. For others, however, this is inade-
quate. See generally Schiller, supra note 49, at 1147; Brian L. Weakland, Condomin-
ium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 297
(1986).
76 See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3] [b] [ii].
See id.
78 See, e.g., Blood v. Edgars, 632 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). Blood
held that "absent a prior judicial determination of illegality, a unit owner must pay
its share of the assessed common expenses. Self-help remedies, such as withholding
condominium common expense assessments, are not available." Id. The court also
noted that "a unit owner is not without remedy or recourse to challenge the propri-
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wards strengthening the rights of the condominium association
to enforce its rules and restrictions." The combination of pre-
venting unit owners from taking matters into their own hands
and the legislative trend makes this remedy one of the more ef-
fective ones. It is effective not only because the unit owner may
care more about these services than one's voting rights or the
imposition of fines, but also because it is one of the more likely
remedies to be upheld. If a unit owner is unwilling to abide by
the rules of the community, it makes sense that a prohibition be
imposed restricting participation in the services offered to the
community until compliance with the rules is achieved. As al-
ways, it is imperative that the association provide for this rem-
edy in its governing documents to prevent a successful defense of
"lack of authority."
C. Monetary Sanctions or Fines
The laws regarding the assessment and collection of fines in
the context of a recalcitrant unit owner vary widely from state to
state.0 Courts differ as to the degree of fines considered reason-
able8" and on the extent of due process required.82 Some juris-
ety of common expense assessments. We suggest that aggrieved unit owners should
timely pay-under protest-the common expense assessment. Thereafter, a judicial
determination of the legality of the assessment, and suitable reimbursement, may
be sought." Id. at 421-22; see also Baker v. Monga, 590 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1992) ("Absent an adjudication.. .that the condominium association's
adoption of its budget or imposition of its assessment was accomplished in bad faith
or in excess of its authority, condominium charges by the unit owners' organization
are not subject to set-off or some other form of self-help remedy."); Mountain View
Condominium Ass'n v. Rumford Ass'n, No. CV 94556935, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS
591, at *4-*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1997) (noting that an owner cannot "properly
withhold payment of lawfilly assessed common charges").
79 In Blood, the court commented:
[Tihe Legislature has consistently amended the act to strengthen common
expense collection. For example, under an amendment effective as of
March 1, 1992, unit owners are personally liable for common expense as-
sessments and these may be collected and applied against the unit owner's
debt, as within statutory limitations, from any tenant renting the unit. In
addition, if a receiver is appointed, a lien for charges for expenses incurred
by the receiver is given "priority over all other liens, and mortgages except
municipal liens."
See Blood, 632 N.E.2d at 421 n.2 (citations omitted).
See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3] [6] [iv], at 44-58.
81 See supra Part II.
Cf 1A ROHAN & RESKEN, supra note 21, § 43.05[2][c]. ("The Uniform Condo-
minium Act and the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act provide that the levy
of a fine requires both prior notice and opportunity to be heard.").
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dictions have taken the view that fines are impermissible
"penalties,"' while other jurisdictions permit a lien on unpaid
common charges and assessments, but not for fines, attorney's
fees and other expenses incurred during recovery.8
To help sort out this jurisprudence, the case of BuildAmerica
is again demonstrative.85 The Virginia Supreme Court held the
fine imposed to be an unconstitutional penalty and drew a dis-
tinction between "assessments" and "fines."86 Referencing Black's
Law dictionary, the court noted that an "assessment" is the unit
owner's portion of the expenses for the maintenance of the com-
mon areas, whereas a "fine" is a penalty.87 Further, a fine
"disguised as an assessment"' could not be imposed. 9 Taking
the contractarian view, it concluded that penalties were not al-
lowed.' "[T]he imposition of a fine is a governmental power.
The sovereign cannot be preempted of this power, and the power
cannot be delegated or exercised other than in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and of
Virginia."9
The line between an unenforceable penalty and a permissi-
ble recoupment of loss is, of course, subjective and dependent
upon the facts of the case. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts offers two factors to determine whether the fixed damages
are "so unreasonably large as to be a penalty."92 The first factor
See Unit Owners' Ass'n of BuildAmerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378, 383
(Va. 1982). In response to this opinion, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute
authorizing "fines." See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3] [b]; see also
Spratt v. Henderson Mill Condominium Ass'n, 481 S.E.2d 879, 881 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997) (noting that an assessment is "neither a liquidated damages award nor an un-
enforceable penalty [but] a fine specifically allowed by statute").
"'See Board of Managers of 140 East 56t St. Condominium v. Hausner, 666
N.Y.S.2d 619, 619 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that the court properly granted attor-
ney's fees, but determining that the fees granted were unreasonable compared to
the outstanding common charges); In re Mishkin, 85 B.R. 18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that a lien could not be granted for attorney's fees because the declaration
of condominium expressly forbade such a lien). But see Colonial Court Homeowners'
Ass'n v. Cole, No. CV 960560458, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3489, at *4 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Dec. 29, 1997) (holding that attorney's fees may be collected).
For a summary of the facts of BuildAmerica, 292 S.E.2d 378 (Va. 1982), see
supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
BuildAmerica, 292 S.E.2d at 384.
Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (5th ed. 1979)).
8Id.
8See id.
See id.
91 Id.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b (1981).
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is "the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach."" The
second factor is "the difficulty of proof of loss."' As the difficulty
in proving that a loss has occurred or the amount of the loss in-
creases, so does the likelihood that the amount fixed is reason-
able.95 Any "assessment" deemed to be a penalty will be unen-
forceable as against public policy.96
Toward this end, it is suggested that the association compile
a record of its reasoning behind setting the assessment at a par-
ticular level, perhaps by putting such reasoning in the house
rules distributed to unit owners, or in the by-laws of the associa-
tion, or perhaps in the minutes of the meeting adopting the rele-
vant house rule or use restriction. The justifications for setting
an assessment at a certain level could be to recoup the costs of
monitoring compliance and subsequent enforcement, as well as
the expected costs to the association for recovery, including its
attorney's fee schedule.
D. The Recovery of Assessments
Usually, statutes and the condominium association docu-
ments provide for a lien on the unit for unpaid assessments, 7
and give the association standing to sue.98 Such a lien may be
foreclosed in the same manner as a mortgage on real property.99
w Id.
94 Id
's See id.
9" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). The Restatement
reads in pertinent part:
Liquidated Damages and Penalties
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy as a penalty.
See id. cmt. a ("The central objective behind the system of contract remedies is com-
pensatory, not punitive.").
7See Unif. Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-116, 7 U.L.A. 600 (1994)
(providing a lien right for collection of fines unless the declaration provides other-
wise).
e3 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 383 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 1997) (allowing
"[a]n association established to manage a common interest development" to have
standing to sue without having to join the individual owners). If the association does
not have standing to sue, the unit owners may have to attain class action status to
sue. See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 42.10[1].
" See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-aa (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998)
("Such lien may be foreclosed by suit authorized by and brought in the name of the
board of managers... in like manner as a mortgage of real property. . . ."); see also
1999]
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However, some states do require that the lien be recorded in or-
der to be valid."' For other states, recordation of the declaration
of condominium authorizing the lien is notice enough.' In many
cases, any such lien allowed will be subordinate to a first mort-
gage, so the association should be wary of foreclosing until a
comparison is made between the charges due and the amount
outstanding on the first mortgage (if any). 2 Also, even where
such a lien is given priority over a first mortgage, the lien is
typically still subject to any monies the unit owner may owe to
the municipality, city, or state.
10 3
E. Recovery of Attorney's Fees
As discussed above, it is often necessary for the association
to attempt recovery of what might seem like trivial fines." Such
action is required of the association due to both the cumulative
effect of allowing seemingly trivial fines to "slide," and to ensure
that the association does not open itself up to liability. Such li-
Unif. Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) and Unif. Condominium Act (UCA)
§ 3-115(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.113(1) and 718.116(6)(a) (1988); cf 1A ROHAN &
RESKIN, supra note 21, §§ 43.03[4 and 45.09 [1] n.1 (listing the relevant statutes for
38 states and the District of Columbia).
'00 See, e.g., In re Eatman, 182 B.R. 386 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that NY
grants a condominium association a lien, but a notice of lien must be filed to be
valid); In re Raymond, 129 B.R. 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (allowing a lien for un-
paid common charges if recorded); see also 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note
21, § 45.09 n.3 (listing 15 states and their relevant statutes).
101 See id.
'02 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998), which
provides in pertinent part:
The board of managers ... shall have a lien on each unit for the unpaid
common charges thereof, together with interest thereon, prior to all other
liens except only (i) liens for taxes on the unit in favor of any assessing
unit, school district, special district, county or other taxing unit, and (ii) all
sums unpaid on a first mortgage of record, and (iii) all sums unpaid or on a
subordinate mortgage of record held by the New York job development
authority.
Id. This does not mean, however, that the association could not foreclose on its liens,
obtain title and rent out the property, and pay the remaining amounts due on the
first mortgage itself. See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 45.10[2]; see also
Bankers Trust Co. v. Board of Managers of the Park 900 Condominium, 616 N.E.2d
848 (N.Y. 1993) (maintaining priority of a first mortgage lien over a lien for unpaid
common charges). But see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
1m See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998). It is
not unusual for an individual who is anticipating filing for bankruptcy to stop pay-
ing everyone altogether. The association should keep in mind that it may not be the
only Rarty trying to recover from the unit owner.
See supra Parts I-III and accompanying notes.
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ability includes actions by compliant unit owners for not enforc-
ing the house rules against recalcitrant unit owners, and claims
of selective enforcement by the unit owners subject to the asso-
ciation's enforcement powers. Liability also includes claims by
recalcitrant unit owners that an association's failure to act was
in bad faith, designed to allow the fines to accrue. However, in
many instances the cost of recovery is far greater than the fines
themselves. Ensuring an association's longevity depends greatly
on its ability to recoup a portion of these costs, including attor-
ney's fees related to fine collection."5 In addition, while the
threat of a $100 fine may be considered trivial by a unit owner,
the thought of having to pay the association's costs in exacting
compliance may cause the condominium owner to pay what is
owed."6
As with any other action the association might take, it will
only have the ability to recover attorney's fees if such recovery is
provided for and not prohibited by the relevant condominium
documents and statutes. Particularly, when deciding whether to
award one party attorney's fees, the court is more likely to take a
contractarian view, treating the by-laws and any other docu-
ments as an agreement between the unit owner and the associa-
tion. ' 7 In such a case, standard contract rules seem to apply.
Therefore, each party typically must bear his own costs unless
the parties have agreed otherwise by contract,'08 or unless the
conduct of one party is so egregious as to warrant an award.'0 9
105 See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 43.0213]:
[11f the documents fail to allow the association to recover reasonable attor-
neys' fees incurred in judicial enforcement (where such recovery is not
provided by statute), it could be difficult for the association to enforce the
rules, regulations, and restrictions contained in the condominium docu-
ments.
Id.; see also Nottingdale Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Darby, 514 N.E.2d 702, 706
(Ohio 1987) (noting that if a court did not award reasonable attorney's fees, the ex-
pense of collection would render the effort useless).
1'0 See IA ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 43.02[3] ("Legal action against a
recalcitrant owner can be costly and the association's ability to receive an award for
attorneys' fees is often a helpful element in obtaining compliance.")
'0 See supra Part 1.C.3.
13 See 20 A1,. JUlm 2D Costs § 72 (1965).
103 See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3]. But compare 181 E. 73d
St. Co. v. 181 E. 73d St. Tenants Corp., 954 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a
party may recover attorney's fees under the Abuse Relief Act only if the suit is
lacking in substantial merit) with 305 E. 24th Owners Corp. v. Parman Co., 994
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff need not show that defendant's opposi-
tion was frivolous to recover reasonable attorney's fees).
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In addition, some jurisdictions specifically provide for the recov-
ery of attorney's fees by statute, while other courts have held
that the ability to recover reasonable attorney's fees need not be
statutorily provided.110
Although there undoubtedly does exist some outer limit as to
the amount of recoverable costs, including attorney's fees and
costs associated with the administration and monitoring of
compliance, such a limit is ill-defined. In some cases the asso-
ciation might be limited to what is "reasonable," in others, this
limit might be what one could term as "reasonable plus.""' It is
fair to say that there should be some relation between the
amount to be recovered and the costs involved in recovering it,
although exactly what this relationship is remains unclear."
Suffice it to say, the limit probably falls somewhere between the
110 See In re Hampton, 142 B.R. 51 (Bankr. Conn. 1992) (requiring that debtor-
unit owner's chapter 13 bankruptcy plan include pre-petition costs and attorney's
fees to the association); see also The Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief
Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 3611(d) (1988); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(f) (Deering 1994 &
Supp. 1996) (awarding the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 718.303(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (indicating the prevailing party can re-
cover reasonable attorney's fees).
.. See supra Part I.C.1 and accompanying notes (asserting that sometimes a
court will enforce even an unreasonable provision so long as provided for in the con-
dominium association documents, and the unit owner had at least constructive
knowledge of the provision); see also Carl B. Kress, Comment, Beyond NahrstedL-
Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 843 (1995) (stating that some jurisdictions apply the business judgment rule
and refuse to engage in an analysis of the reasonableness of provisions contained in
condominium association documents).
"2 See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 45.04[1]. Dean Rohan's treatise
suggests that, so as to be able to recover all costs of collection, an association not
limit itself in its condominium documents to a percentage of the unpaid assessments
or other amounts due to the association:
Even if the association has the right to recover a high percentage of a rela-
tively small amount due, the association will not cover its legal fees.... It
may even be appropriate to specifically have authorized not only the recov-
ery of reasonable legal fees but the specific hourly rates or other fee ar-
rangement so there is little doubt that the unit owner is responsible for all
the legal fees of the association.
Id.; see also Wehunt v. Wren's Cross of Atlanta Condominium Ass'n, 332 S.E.2d 368
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that if the governing documents permitting reasonable
attorney's fees do not specify a certain percentage, the attorney's fees may be many
times in excess of assessment).
Any disparity between the amount of recovery and the costs to be awarded,
however, does not preclude the award of attorney's fees. See Sockolof v. Eden Point
N. Condominium Ass'n, 487 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the
court is required to award attorney's fees within the parameters of expert evidence).
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fees awarded in Wehunt v. Wren's Cross of Atlanta. and Ziontz
v. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n."' While Wehunt awarded
$9000 in attorney's fees for the collection of $906 in common ex-
penses and late charges," 5 Ziontz, which was reversed on ap-
peal,"16 awarded $60,000 in a foreclosure of a $100 common as-
sessment."7 Practically speaking, the inclusion of a provision
allowing the recovery of costs and attorney's fees in the condo-
minium documents is of utmost importance to augmenting its
significance and its potential for enforceability.
IV. DEFENSES OF THE UNIT OWNER
Predictably, the unit owner likely will not sit idly by and al-
low the association to levy a fine or foreclose on his home."8
Typically, his defenses to these actions will come in the form of a
claim alleging lack of authority,"9 waiver," or selective enforce-
ment.
The defense of lack of authority reinforces the caveats ex-
pressed elsewhere in this Note, namely that the association
should reserve the authority to make and amend the house rules
in its governing documents, and be sure that the restriction is
not prohibited by its own documents or some state or federal law.
To protect against claims of waiver and selective enforce-
ment, the association should be sure to act swiftly and uniformly
in enforcing the house rules. A claim of waiver arises where the
association has been put on notice of some action, and yet fails to
enforce the applicable restriction. Mutual Redevelopment
113 See Wehunt, 332 S.E.2d at 368.
114 Ziontz v. Ocean Trail Unit Owner's Ass'n, 663 So. 2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
" See Wehunt, 332 S.E.2d at 372.
'6 See Ziontz, 663 So. 2d at 1336.
117 Even this decision was a close call. The decision to overrule the lower court
was split. See id. at 1337 (revealing that even in this case there was a difference of
opinion as to whether a $60,000 award was reasonable); see also Nottingdale Home-
owners' Ass'n v. Darby, 514 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio 1987) (awarding $12,000 in attorney's
fees in a case to collect $2,500); Park Place E. Condominium Ass'n v. Hovbilt, 652
A.2d 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (permitting $27,500 in counsel fees in an
assessment collection matter).
' ' See, e.g., Stewart v. Kopp, 454 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
" See supra Part II (discussing the authority of associations to assess the unit
owner).
121 See Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. v. Hanft, 249 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Civ. Ct.
1964); 2A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 11.09, at 11-17.
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Houses, Inc. v. Hanft,12' a case involving a cooperative associa-
tion, is demonstrative of the theory, though not necessarily con-
trolling."2 In Mutual Redevelopment Houses, the cooperator dis-
covered the prohibition of pets while at the closing, after paying
for a portion of his stock and lease.' His attorney notified the
cooperative association, in writing, that the unit owner would
keep his dog, and the owner made no attempt to hide the pet
while living in the co-op." The court held that the association
had waived the prohibition of pets for this cooperator since over
five months had passed before the association attempted to en-
force the rule."
A successful claim of selective enforcement will depend
largely on the specific facts of the case. In many instances, how-
ever, the association is given the benefit of the doubt so long as it
can assert a valid reason for any disparity in application." As
with enforcement of the law, enforcement of the by-laws and
house rules by the association is reasoned to be for the ultimate
benefit of all. 7
121 Hanft, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
122 It is unclear exactly how these facts would translate over in the case of a
condominium. While cooperative associations generally have more freedom to act
than condominium associations because of the lessor-lessee nature of the relation-
ship, a court may be wary of allowing an exception in the case of a condominium
unit, where the fee estate owned is more secure than the leasehold interest held by
the cooperator.
1'2 Hanft, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 1046.
124 Id.
125 Id.
12 See 1A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 21, § 44.06[3]. For example, a provision
which is applied only prospectively may be held valid even though it creates two
classes of individuals-those who are "grandfathered" and those who are not. See
Chattel Shipping and Inv., Inc. v. Brickell Place Condominium Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 29
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In addition, absent some official showing of the associa-
tion's reasoning, the court may come to a different conclusion. See Hidden Harbour
Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the evidence
at trial contradicted all of the board's grounds for refusing the unit owner's request
and, therefore, the by-law provision would not be enforced).
Keep in mind, however, that enforcement remains subject to the general re-
quirement that the provision must be authorized (and not prohibited) by the by-
laws. See Barnett & Klein Corp. v. President of Palm Beach (A Condominium), 426
So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The court, in Barnett & Klein, found
that a house rule creating two classes of unit owners was ultra vires due to a by-law
requiring that all rules and regulations "be equally applicable to all members, and
uniform in their application and effect." Id.
127 See O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 182 Cal. Rptr. 111, (Ct. App.
1982) (finding that "enforcement ... fosters condominium development by attract-
ing buyers seeking a stable, planned environment... [and] also protects the [rights
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V. SUGGESTIONS TO THE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION
The first step the developing condominium association
should take is to check the applicable statutes in the relevant
jurisdiction and ensure that the provisions it wishes to enact are
permitted, or not specifically prohibited, by the enacting stat-
utes. Assuming no bars on the statutory level, the association
should then provide itself the authority to enact house rules and
other restrictions in the governing documents, including the
declaration of condominium and by-laws. It should similarly
provide itself with the authority to amend the by-laws and house
rules, without notice.' The association should also include in its
by-laws the ability to recover its costs and attorney's fees, as well
as any assessments for non-compliance with the rules. In addi-
tion, the association should post a copy of the by-laws and house
rules in the association office or in a common area, and periodi-
cally distribute copies of the house rules to the unit owners.
In adopting a use restriction, the association should keep a
record of its reasoning, so that if necessary it can demonstrate to
the court that its actions were not arbitrary. The reasons for
adopting a particular restriction could include advice from an in-
dependent outside source, which the board should consider con-
sulting. The association should consider all of the factors which
will contribute to its costs, and plan any assessments for non-
conformity accordingly. The monetary sanctions may be as-
sessed on a per day basis, but should not be so high that the as-
sessment could be considered an impermissible penalty. If the
unit owner remains non-compliant, other action should be taken
to prevent the continually accruing assessments from reaching a
level at which the court may characterize them as an attempt by
the association to penalize the unit owner.
Violations should be addressed quickly and uniformly, to
of those] who may pay a premium to obtain restrictions") (quoting Note, Judicial
Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647, 653 (1981), vacated on
other grounds, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1982); see also Wayne S. Hyatt, The Community
Association: An Introduction, 2 MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 789, 795
(ALT/ABA Course of Study Materials 1987) (discussing the importance of good faith
in rule enforcement).
123 Even though the association should retain the right to amend the by-laws
and house rules without notice, the association should nevertheless provide ade-
quate notice to the unit owners, as a deprivation without notice could be considered
a violation of due process. See Hyatt, supra note 127, at 792 (stating that the gov-
ernmental role of an association creates the obligation for it to act with sufficient
regard for due process and equal protection principles).
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prevent defenses of waiver or selective enforcement. The asso-
ciation should provide adequate notice to the unit owner, in the
form of multiple notices to act. For example, the association
should notify the unit owner that compliance must be met within
30 days, in order to avoid certain specified consequences. Simi-
lar warning should be communicated 15 days later and so forth
until the date on which action commences. Such warnings also
help the association to demonstrate that it has given the unit
owner every opportunity to comply, and is therefore coming into
court with "clean hands."
CONCLUSION
Over time, any market must change to meet the needs of its
consumers. In the market of community living, there is a need
to own something free and clear-a fee estate which the unit
owner can call her own. While the satisfaction of this need has
posed certain problems for associations dealing with a recalci-
trant unit owner, there is no reason why an association which
has been properly organized should find itself inadequately pre-
pared to deal with even the unruliest of owners. Evicting a con-
dominium unit owner may continue be as difficult as expelling
an annoying neighbor in the house next door. However, the
methods outlined in this Note should help to ensure that a unit
owner does not frequently or permanently overstep the bounds.
Of course, the most valuable tool in addressing
"recalcitrants" could be to create an association review board to
effectively screen out a suspect applicant in the first place. An
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
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